We have published several articles about generalizations and boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem during the last 25 years,
Introduction
The existence of a deep chasm between the goals of Hilbert's consistency program and the implications of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem was immediately apparent when Gödel announced his famous millennial discovery [17] .
Interestingly, neither Gödel (in 1931) nor Hilbert (during the remainder of his life) dismissed the existence of possible compromise solutions, whereby a fragment of the goals of the Consistency Program could remain intact. For instance, Hilbert never withdrew his statement * for justifying his Constancy Program in [25] : * " Let us admit that the situation in which we presently find ourselves with respect to paradoxes is in the long run intolerable. Just think: in mathematics, this paragon of reliability and truth, the very notions and inferences, as everyone learns, teaches, and uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would reliability and truth be found if even mathematical thinking fails?" Indeed, the motto of Hilbert's Consistency Program ("Wir müssen wissen-Wir werden wissen" ) was engraved onto Hilbert's tombstone 1 .
Also, Gödel was cautious (at least in the early 1930's) not to speculate about whether all facets of Hilbert's Consistency program would come to a termination. He thus inserted the following cautious caveat into his famous 1931 millennial paper [17] :
the Second Incompleteness until after learning about Turing's work [44] during the mid-
1930's.
Most of the research that has followed Gödel's historic 1931 seminal discovery has focused on studying generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, rather then exploring its possible boundary-case exceptions. Many of these generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem [2, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 22, 29, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 45, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56] are quite beautiful. The author of this paper is especially impressed by a generalization of the Second Incompleteness Effect, arrived at by the combined work of Pudlák and Solovay (abetted by the research of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris) [31, 36, 41, 46] .
These results, which also have been more recently discussed in [7, 20, 42, 51] , have noted the Second Incompleteness Theorem does not require the presence of the Principle of Induction to apply to most formalisms that use a Hilbert-style form of deduction. (The next chapter will offer a detailed summary of this important generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in its Remark 2.5.)
Our research, during the last 25 years has had a different focus, exploring BoundaryCase exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem more intensively than its generalizations. It would be natural for many readers to ask why such exceptions should also be studied, so intensively?
The reason is that while generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem are very pure form a mathematical standpoint, it must not be forgotten that Mankind's survival in the future will require developing formalisms that own enough ingenuity to solve a variety of pressing ecological problems, such as Global Warming, in a satisfactory manner.
More specifically, the solution of mundane problems, threatening human survival, do not require use of a formalism producing short proofs of the existence of large integers, whose binary encodings employ more digits than the number of atoms in the universe.
It is, however, vital for mature logical formalisms to appreciate their own consistency, in at least a fragmentary sense, when they reason about the implications of their own reasoning. (Otherwise, a Thinking Being, whether computerized or human, would not be able to explain to itself fully why it is of foundational importance to study its own thinking process, as a fundamental problem-solving facility.)
In particular, there is no doubt that a branch of mathematics, that makes it difficult to manufacture abbreviated proofs of the existence of numbers as large as a google-plex (e.g. 2 2 100 ), does fall short of the Utopian ideals that the intellectual community wishes for
Mathematics. We will argue, however, that the striking engineering needs that confront modern Mankind requires the evolution of alternate formalisms, however theoretically weak, for an adequate result to be obtained for many more pressing issues.
In other words, we will contend that Hilbert and Gödel were essentially correct when their statements * and * * suggested that a nihilistic approach, which ignores the engineeringstyle capacities of weaker formalisms, that own a fragmented conception of their own consistency, has serious short-comings. This is because the dangers of Global Warming and other imminent threats that endanger 21-st century Mankind are too serious for logicians to entertain using anything less than a formalism, which possesses at least a fragmentary conception of its own consistency.
Also, we will discuss an addition to our prior research about self-justifying logics, called
Deductive Enrichment, which should convince skeptical readers that our formalisms do indeed have practical value. Especially within a special context where modern computers can perform arithmetic operations with more than a billion times the speed of a human being, we will argue our boundary-case exceptions to the prior century's Second
Incompleteness Theorem have noteworthy pragmatic significance.
As the reader examines this paper, it should be kept in mind that all our self-justifying axiom systems (since 1993) contain an ability to prove analogs of all the Π 1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic under a slightly revised language (such as §3's L * formalism). This fact is non-trivial because an axiom system that recognizes its own consistency will contain little pragmatic significance, if it does not maintain an ability to prove all the quite central Π 1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic.
What will make our formalisms tempting in the current article is the new notion of "Deductive Enrichment". It will allow a formalism to maintain a simultaneous knowledge about its own consistency together with a recognition about the truth behind the Π 1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic.
In particular, we do not dispute that our formalism will fall short of the Utopian ideals for mathematics when it is unable to produce a brief proof for the existence of large numbers, such as a google-plex (e.g. 2 2 100 ). We will, however, claim our formalism contains some pragmatic value when it can own a simultaneous knowledge about its own consistency and the truth behind the Π 1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic.
General Notation and Literature Survey
Let us call an ordered pair (α, d) a "Generalized Arithmetic" when its first and second components are defined as follows:
1. The Axiom Basis " α " of a Generalized Arithmetic will be defined as the set of proper axioms it employs.
2. The second component " d " of a Generalized Arithmetic will be defined as the combination of its formal rules of inference and the logical axioms "
ploys. This second component, " d " of a Generalized Arithmetic will be called its ⊕ There is no proof (using d's deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union of the axiom system α with this sentence "SelfRef(α, d) " (looking at itself).
Kleene discussed in [28] how to encode rough analogs of the above "I Am Consistent" will cause this extended version of α , ironically, to become automatically inconsistent.
Thus, the encoding of "SelfRef(α, d)" is relatively easy, via an application of the Fixed Point Theorem, but this sentence is often, ironically, entirely useless! Definition 2.4 Let Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicate symbols specifying that x+y = z and x * y = z (under Π 1 styled-encodings for the associative, commutative, identity and distributive principles using these two 3-way predicate symbols). Let α denote what the first paragraph of this section had called an "axiom basis".
We will then say that α recognizes successor, addition and multiplication as Total
Functions iff it can prove (1) -(3) as theorems.
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z)
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z)
Also, an axiom basis α will be called Type-M iff it includes (1) -(3) as theorems,
Type-A if it includes only (1) and (2) as theorems, and Type-S if it contains only (1) as a theorem. Also, α is called Type-NS iff it can prove none of these theorems. (1)'s Type-S statement and assuring the successor operation will satisfy both x ′ = 0 and x ′ = y ′ ⇔ x = y. Then (α, d) cannot verify its own consistency whenever simultaneously d is a Hilbert-style deductive apparatus and α treats addition and multiplication as 3-way relations, satisfying their usual associative, commutative distributive and identity axioms.
Essentially, Solovay [41] privately communicated to us in 1994 an analog of theorem ++. Many authors have noted Solovay has been reluctant to publish his nice privately communicated results on many occasions [7, 22, 31, 33, 36, 46] . Thus, approximate analogs of ++ were explored subsequently by Buss-Ignjatovic, Hájek andŠvejdar in [7, 20, 42] , as well as in Appendix A of our paper [51] . Also, Pudlák's initial 1985 article [36] captured the majority of ++'s essence, chronologically before Solovay's observations. Also, Friedman did related work in [14] .
b.
Part of what makes ++ interesting is that [51, 55, 56, 62] explored two methods for generalized arithmetics to confirm their own consistency, whose natural hybridizations are precluded by ++. Specifically, these results involve using Example 2.3's self-referencing "I am consistent" axiom (from its statement ⊕ ). They will enable several Type-NS basis systems [51, 56, 62] 
General Perspective
This section will explain how some seemingly minor hair-thin Boundary-Case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be transformed into major chasms when one contemplates the facts that 21-st century computers can perform arithmetic computations with more than a billion times the speed of the human mind (with a similar accompanying increase in the lengths of the logical sentences being manipulated). This distinction will raise questions about whether 21-st century engineering projects will ultimately be forced to encounter questions about the Second Incompleteness Theorem, which were ignored when the scientific world had first learned about Gödel's work during the early 1930's.
Linguistic Notation
Our language for formalizing exceptions to the Second Incompleteness theorem will be called L * . It will include the symbols C 0 , C 1 and C 2 for representing the integers of 0, 1 and 2. The language L * will discuss the properties of non-negative integers greater than 2, in terms of these three starting integers, as will be explained in this section.
The predicate symbols used by our language L * will be the equality and less-thanor-equal predicates, denoted as " = " and " ≤ " . Sometimes, we will informally also use the symbols ≥ , < and > .
Define F (a 1 , a 2 , ...a j ) to be a NON-GROWTH FUNCTION iff for all values of
..a j ) . Our axiom systems will employ a set of eight non-growth functions, called the GROUNDING FUNCTIONS. They will include:
1. Integer Subtraction where x − y is defined to equal zero when x < y,
Integer Division where
x y = x when y = 0 , and it otherwise equals ⌊ x y ⌋ .
7. Count(x, j) designating the number of "1" bits among x's rightmost j bits.
Bit(x, i) designating the value of the integer x's i−th rightmost bit. (Note that
In addition to the above non-growth functions, our language L * will employ two growth functions. They will correspond to Integer-Addition and Double(x) = x + x. We will use the term U-Grounding Function to refer to a function that is one of our eight
Grounding Functions or the operations of Addition and Doubling.
Comment 3.1 We do not technically need both the operations of Addition and Doubling in our U-Grounding language L * . However, it much is easier to encode large integers when we have access to both these function symbols. For example, any integer N > 1 can be encoded by a term of length O( Log(N) ) , using only the constant symbol for "1", when both the addition and doubling function symbols are present. For instance, below is our binary-like encoding for the number eleven.
Henceforth, the symbol N will denote such a binary-like encoding for the integer N .
(In the degenerate case where N = 0 , 0 will simply be defined as being the constant symbol " C 0 ", that represents zero's value.)
Definition 3.2 We will follow mostly conventional logic notation when discussing the U-Grounding functions. Thus, a term is defined to be a constant symbol, a variable symbol or a function symbol (followed by some input arguments, which are similarly defined terms). If t is a term then the quantifiers in
will be called bounded quantifiers. These two wffs will be semantically equivalent to the respective formulae of ∀v ( v ≤ t ⇒ Ψ(v)) and ∃v ( v ≤ t ∧ Ψ(v)). A formula Φ will be called ∆ * 0 iff all its quantifiers are bounded. Thus a ∆ * 0 formula is defined to be a wff that is any combination of atomic formulae (using our ten U-Grounding functions and the equals and ≤ predicates) combined by bounded quantifiers and the boolean operations of AND,OR, NOT and IMPLIES in an arbitrary manner. (7) are (8) are examples of Π * 1 sentences. Note that some Π * 2 sentences can be proven to be logically equivalent to Π * 1 sentences. Thus for example, the sentences in Lines (5) and (8) are logically equivalent to each other.
Note that while Line (5) can be transformed into a logically equivalent Π * 1 sentence (encoded by Line (8) ), there is no analogous Π * 1 sentence equivalent to Line (6) . (This is because Addition but not Multiplication belongs to our set of U-Grounding functions.) Remark 3.5 Throughout all our papers, the symbols Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two ∆ * 0 formulae that are satisfied precisely when the respective conditions of x + y = z and x * y = z are true. It turns out that we can define both these formulae using only the non-growth functions of integer subtraction and division. Such definitions of Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) are provided by Lines (9) and (10) below
In this context, an axiom system α will be said to recognize Addition "as a total function" iff it can prove
Likewise, we will say an axiom system α can recognize Multiplication "as a total function" iff it can prove
Also, we will say an axiom system α can recognize Successor (i.e. the operation of "plus one") as a total function iff it can prove
Some axiom systems α are unable to prove Multiplication is a total function, but they can prove every true ∆ * 0 sentence. Other axiom systems are unable to recognize any of Addition, Multiplication or Successor as total functions, but they can still prove every true ∆ * 0 sentence. It will turn out these facts will be central to understanding the generality and limitations of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Definition 3.6 A sentence Φ will be said to be written in Prenex* Normal Form iff for some i ≥ 0 , it can be written as a Π * i or a Σ * i sentence. (It can be easily established that a predicate logic, using the language L * , can show that every sentence Φ can be mapped onto a Prenex* sentence Φ * such that Φ ⇔ Φ * . Thus without any loss in generality, we may assume that all the proper axioms within a basis system α can be encoded in a Prenex* normalized form.)
Enriched Forms of Tableaux Deduction
We will first employ our preceding language L * to review the definition of "Semantic Tableaux" deduction in this section. We will then define two minor variations of this construct, called the Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enriched versions of Tableaux deduction. The addition of these Rank-Zero constructs to the tableaux formalism will, likely, first appear to the a minor wrinkle to most readers. It will turn out, however, that the factor-billion difference between the speeds of a human mind and of a digital computer will make our added "Rank-Zero" refinement useful.
Our definition of a semantic tableaux proof will be very similar to its counterparts in Fitting's and Smullyan's textbooks [11, 40] . Define a Φ-Focused Candidate Tree for the axiom system α to be a tree structure whose root corresponds to the sentence ¬ Φ and whose all its other nodes are either formal axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes of the tree. Let the notation " A =⇒ B " indicate that B is a valid deduction when A is an ancestor of B . In this notation, the deduction rules allowed in a candidate tree are:
2. ¬ ¬ Υ =⇒ Υ . Other Tableaux rules for the " ¬ " symbol are:
3. A pair of sibling nodes Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ ∨ Γ .
4. A pair of sibling nodes ¬Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ → Γ.
5. ∃v Υ(v) =⇒ Υ(u) where u is a newly introduced "Parameter Symbol". 6. Our variation of Rule 5 for bounded existential quantifiers of the form " ∃v ≤ s " is the identity:
7. ∀v Υ(v) =⇒ Υ(t) where t denotes any U-Grounded term. These terms are defined to be parameter symbols, constant symbols, or U-Grounding functions with recursively defined inputs.
8. Our variation of Rule 7 for bounded universal quantifiers of the form " ∀v ≤ s " is the identity:
Define a particular leaf-to-root branch in a candidate tree T to be Closed iff it contains both some sentence Υ and its negation ¬ Υ . A Semantic Tableaux proof of Φ will then be defined to be a candidate tree, all of whose root-to-leaf branches are closed, such that the tree's root stores the sentence ¬Φ and where all its other nodes are either axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes.
Definition 3.7 Let Z denote an arbitrary set of sentences in our language L * .
Recall that a node in semantic tableaux proof from an axiom system α is allowed to include any axiom of α as one of its stored sentences. Such a proof will be called a Z-Enriched proof if it may also include any version of (14)'s formalization of the "Law of the Excluded Middle" as a permissible logical axiom when Ψ ∈ Z .
It is well known that semantic tableaux proofs satisfy Gödel's Completeness Theorem [11, 40] . This implies that the set of theorems that are proven from an axiom system α via a conventional (unenriched) version of semantic tableaux deduction is the same as the set of theorems proven from a Z-enriched version of this deductive mechanism. Our main result in this section will show, however, that such proofs can have their efficiency often exponentially improved via such enrichments, when Line (14)'s schema is treated as a set of logical axioms (rather than as a collection of derived theorems). 
A Brief Sketched Justification:
The germane proof p of Φ will follow the usual semantic tableaux format by having its root store the sentence ¬ Φ . The child of this root will then consist of Line (14)'s version of the Law of the Excluded Middle. Also, the two children of this node will consist of the sentences of ¬Ψ and Ψ . We omit the details, but it is easy to then verify that:
a. one may insert a subtree below ¬Ψ that is no longer than linearly proportional to the length of Ψ 's proof.
b. one may insert a subtree below Ψ that is no longer than linearly proportional to the length of the proof of Ψ ⇒ Φ .
These constraints imply that the Ψ-Based Linear Constrained Cut Rule will be satisfied.
.
Definition 3.11
There will be several types of "Enrichments" of the semantic tableaux deduction method that we will examine in the context of Definitions 3.7 and 3.8. These will include:
1. Infinitely Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)'s variation of the "Law of the Excluded Middle" to become a logical axiom, for any sentence Ψ from L * 's language.
Rank-k Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)'s variation of the "Law of the
Excluded Middle" to be a logical axiom when Ψ is any Π * k or Σ * k sentence.
3. Rank-Zero Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)'s variation of the "Law of the Excluded Middle" to be a logical axiom when Ψ is any ∆ * 0 sentence.
4.
Rank-Zero-Plus Enriched formalisms that are a slightly stronger version of the Rank-Zero formalism that take (15) as a logical axiom for any ∆ * 0 formula ψ(x). An attached appendix will review [55] 's definition of the IS D (α) axiom system, for the benefit of those readers who have not read [55] . (It will amplify upon the claims made in the previous two paragraphs.) Our recommendation is that the reader postpone examining this appendix until after the main sections of the current paper are finished. This is because Definition 3.11's notion of "Deductive Enrichment" is quite subtle, and the next two sections shall need to first consider it in more detail.
The Significance of Deductive Enrichment
A general rule of thumb in Proof Theory is that an axiom system is typically extended in order to expand the class of theorems it can prove. Since semantic tableaux deduction satisfies Gödel's Completeness Theorem, the Definition 3.11's four variations of deductive enrichment will, however, not change the theorems they can be derive from an initial base axiom system. Instead, their function will be to improve the overall proof efficiency.
(This is because an invoked version of the Law of the Excluded Middle will shorten proof lengths when it is treated as a logical axiom, rather than as a derived theorem.)
This issue was perhaps not so central in the early 20-th century when Gödel announced his initial 2-part Incompleteness paradigm. At that time, the only available medium of thought was the Human Brain, which performed arithmetic computations at approximately a billion times a slower speed than that of the typical 21st century household computer. Also, the potential lengths of logical sentences during the 1930's was much shorter than many potentially lengthy present-day computer-generated sentences.
Within the context of the longer expressions that computers can physically produce, the task of separating true from false ∆ * 0 sentences will likely become increasingly daunting (assuming P = NP ), even when this task is technically decidable. Hence a Rank-Zero Enrichment of a tableaux deductive formalism is a useful instrument, with the improved efficiency of its Rank-Zero Linear Constrained Cut Rule. Moreover, the results from our earlier paper [55] do trivially imply that our Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus extensions of Self-Justifying formalism are guaranteed to be consistent. (This is because an application of either the Rank-Zero or Rank-Zero-Plus versions of the Law of the Excluded Middle can be formally encoded within a Π * 1 format, and the attached Appendix explains our results from [55] imply that the addition of any logically valid Π * 1 sentences are compatible with IS D (α) retaining its internal consistency.) In contrast, [54] showed the same is not true for Rank-2 and higher enrichments of tableaux deduction − − − thus causing these formalisms to lose their self-justification property.
Remark 4.1 Many readers will be initially disappointed that Rank-2 and other higher enrichments levels will be of infeasible under self-justifying semantic tableaux deductive systems. This will mean that if Ψ denotes (16) 's declaration that multiplication is a total function then neither can it be assumed to be true by our self-justifying formalisms, nor can the theorem Ψ ∨ ¬Ψ be promoted into becoming a logical axiom (under the self-justifying methods of IS D (α) without producing an inconsistency).
Nevertheless, there is a method whereby our Rank-Zero Enriched formalisms can partially formalize Line (16)'s meaning. Thus, let Ψ k denote the ∆ * 0 formula (shown below) indicating that its localized version of multiplication is a total function among input integers less than 2 k .
Then it turns out that our Rank-Zero enriched versions of tableaux deduction can prove Ψ k as a theorem, as well as treat Ψ k ∨ ¬Ψ k as a logical axiom. We will call Ψ k and the logical axiom Ψ k ∨ ¬Ψ k the K-Localizations of the sentences Ψ and Ψ ∨ ¬Ψ .
In many pragmatic applications, one does not technically need Π * j and Σ * j theorems Φ (with j ≥ 1): Instead, it suffices to prove a K-Localized theorem Φ k , that employs analogs of Line (17)'s three specified bounded quantifiers, for some sufficiently large fixed constant k . In particular, a transition of higher sentences into ∆ * 0 formulae is especially pragmatic for 21st century computers, whose speed and allowed byte-lengths can exceed by factors of many millions their counterparts produced by human mind.
Within such a context, the self-justifying capacities of even a Rank-Zero Enriched form of Semantic tableaux deduction are much more tempting during the 21st century than they were at the time of Gödel 1931 discovery (when computers were unavailable).
It is mainly for this reason that we suspect the modern world should not fully dismiss the capacities of self-justifying logic formalisms.
Moreover, we suspect that the futuristic civilization within our solar system, including that on the planet Earth, may have no choice but to rely upon Self-Justifying computerized logic systems. This is because many scientists (including the late physicist Stephen Hawking) have speculated that if current trends continue, then Global Warming will cause the planet Earth to become too hot for mammals to survive on it, within one or two centuries. In such a context, where computers will not need the Earth's cooler temperatures and/or Oxygen to survive (e.g. see footnote 4 ), Stephen Hawking [23, 24] has predicted that computers may become the main form of thinking agent during what will hopefully be only a temporary period of Global Warming.
Such computers will need, presumably, to rely upon some form of Self-Justifying cognitive process to organize the motivations of their thought processes. In particular, humans seem to have relied upon some type of instinctive appreciation of the coherence of their thought processes, as a prerequisite for motivating their cognitive process. Our suspicion is that computers will need to imitate this self-reinforcing process.
Our conjecture is, thus, that the continuation of human civilization, within our Solar System, may require computers taking temporary control of the larger part of its destiny. More specifically, we suspect that a computer-and-robot technology shall be needed to reverse Global Warming and enable a saved sample of frozen mammal embryos to subsequently populate the planet Earth, again.
In particular, some readers may shutter at the thought that planet Earth could become temporarily uninhabitable during a perhaps thousand-year era of Global Over-Heating.
This difficulty, however, may actually amount to only be a temporary phenomena, if computers and robots can restore Earth into a more hospitable environment after a period of several thousand years (and also frozen human embryos are saved).
More precisely in a context where life has existed on Earth for approximately 4 billion years, our perspective is that the danger posed by Global Warming would be tragic but temporary, if robots and computers can reverse Global Warming after a period of a few thousand years. In contrast, the implications of Global Warming would be much more severe, if either it cannot be reversed or no frozen embryos are saved before Global Warming occurs. It is for this reason that we suggest it is imperative that a fleet of self-justifying computers, along with accompanying robots and saved frozen embryos, be assembled as at least a partial response to a potentially very serious Global Warming crisis. (See footnote 5 for some clarifications about the nature and limits of this proposal.)
Oxygen as an energy supply, nor have their operative functions being governed by the Earth's temperature (when they lie physically outside the planet's domain). 5 It is possible that if computer and robotics technologies do advance quickly enough than a tragic Global Over-Heating can be completely avoided. Moreover, Steven Pinker discusses in [35] some technologies that could possibly eschew global warming. Our point is, however, that it would be wise to also investigate the potential application of self-justifying formalisms because their use may be necessary in the future for Earth's mammals to survive and prosper. The Corollary A.3, in Appendix A, thus illustrates a potential use of self-justifying computerized systems that possibly could be urgent.
Further Remarks
The author of this article has published several articles about generalizations and boundarycase exceptions for Gódel's Second Incompleteness Theorem [49] - [62] , including six papers that have appeared in the JSL and APAL. Unfortunately, the author has experienced both a stroke and heart attack during the summer of 2016.
These events did not prevent the author from continuing his teaching during 2017 and 2018. They did, however, cause a change in the specific goals of our research. Thus, the current article was intended, mostly, to encourage others to join in this research project.
It has, thus, focused on explaining why this topic warrants further investigation. This is subtle because our IS D (α) axiom system (formally defined in the Appendix) has three disadvantages when D denotes semantic tableaux deduction. These drawbacks are that:
1. IS D (α) is an unorthodox "Type-A" axiom system, which recognizes addition but not also multiplication as a total function.
2. IS D (α) has employed a semantic tableaux deductive apparatus, that is much weaker than a more conventional Hilbert-styled deductive apparatus.
3. IS D (α) is able to recognize its consistency only by employing a version of Example 2.3's self-referencing "I am consistent" axiom.
Our reply to Item 1 is that while IS D (α) is unconventional, it is it not quite as weak as it may appear. This is partly because IS D (α) treats multiplication as a 3-way predicate Mult(x, y, z), formalized by Line (10), rather than as a total function. Moreover, IS D (α) can be easily arranged to prove all the Π 1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic (except for minor changes in notation) when its input axiom system α is made to correspond to the trivial extension of Peano Arithmetic that includes our ten U-Grounding functions symbols. While these adjustments may not be ideally Utopian, they are sufficient to reply to the main difficulties raised by Item 1.
Our reply to Item 3 is also easy because the goal of IS D (α) IS NOT TO prove its own consistency under a skinny definition of a proof. It is rather to find an axiom system that is comfortable with a built-in internal assumption about its own consistency. IS D (α) can While we do not wish to ignore the fact that only that only Rank-Zero and RankZero-Plus enrichments of semantic tableaux deduction are known to be compatible with self justification, it should be remarked that even such Rank-Zero enrichments are interesting. This is because one can philosophically argue that a logical sentence loses its purely sensuous quality when it employs unbounded quantifiers. Thus even Π * 1 and Σ * 1 sentences lie slightly above the "touch-and-feel level" on account of their use of unbounded quantifiers. In other words, our available ability to muster self-justifying Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrichments of semantic tableaux deduction is significant because this level of enriching is broad enough to include the crucial "touch-and-feel" sentences of the language L * .
The preceding point is important because it allows us to summarize both the strengths and weaknesses of Gödel's 1931 Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus, the traditional literature has been certainly correct in viewing Gödel's discovery as a seminal result, when our boundary-case exceptions to it have persisted at only the Rank-Zero and RankZero-Plus enrichment levels. On the other hand, the existence of such enrichments show that Gödel and Hilbert were partially correct when their statements * and * * foresaw that some types of exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Effect would persist (e.g. see §1 ). Moreover, the study of how to efficiently process ∆ * 0 sentences is important both because of their "touch-and-feel" property and because it will be challenging to process these sentences efficiently, assuming that P = NP .
Moreover, we remind the reader that Stephen Hawking and other scientists have expressed concern that Global Warming could possibly lead to, at least, a temporary era where digital computers replace human brains as the primary economically efficient mechanism for generating thoughts [23, 24] . In a context where computers can generate thoughts more than a billion times faster than the human mind, the preceding chapter suggested that a self-justifying formalism, using only Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrichments of semantic tableaux, could help computers function more efficiently.
In particular, our fervent hope is that humans will continue to be important and central in the future. It is likely that computerized simulations of the human thought processes will be also important, even if Global Warming occurs as, hopefully, a very temporary phenomena.
The writing of this article has been a quite painful task because this paper conveys a message that is an awkward mixture of insight, hope and humbling realization. Thus our fundamental insight is that some type of borderline exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem will persist, whereby logical formalisms can retain at least some type of partial internalized appreciation of their own consistency. Our accompanying hope is that computers can use this knowledge to help life on Earth survive Global Warming and other futuristic challenges. And finally this paper's humbling but partially optimistic conclusion is that a prosperous life can continue on planet Earth, albeit seemingly only if (?) humans share with computers a joint control over our future destiny.
Added Remark: This paper has been written as an "extended abstract", rather than as a fully detailed exposition, primarily because many of our other papers have discussed related topics in much greater detail. The writing style of an informal extended abstract also seemed preferable because our chief goal has been to stimulate a larger audience of researchers to join us in a project, centered around futuristic self-justifying logic systems.
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employed Line (18)'s particular generic structure for each Π * 1 sentence Φ (e.g. see Footnote 6 ).
2. To "formally recognize" its own Level-1 consistency under D's deductive apparatus.
This was accomplished by having IS D (α)'s "Group-3" axiom formalize a Π * 1 sentence that amounts to (19)'s statement. (The symbol "Pair(x, y)" in Line (19) is a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that x is the Gödel number of a Π * 1 sentence and that y represents x 's "mechanically 7 formalized negation". Also, Prf IS D (α) (a, b) in (19) denotes a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that b is a proof, using the deduction method D , of the theorem a from the axiom system IS D (α).) The nice aspect of (19) is that IS D (α) can unambiguously interpret the meaning of its three ∆ * 0 formulae because its Group-Zero and Group-1 schema allow it to correctly decipher Line
Remark A.1 It is unnecessary to provide a formal description of the axiom system IS D (α) here because §3 of [55] already explained how it (and especially Line (19) ) can be exactly encoded. There are two clarifications relevant to IS D (α)'s definition that should, however, be mentioned. a. Our IS D (α) axiom system is a well defined entity for any deductive apparatus D and for any axiom basis system α (that have recursively enumerable formal structures). Since Line (19) is a self-referencing sentence, one needs some meticulous care, however, to assure that the Fixed Point Theorem can encode a Π * 1 sentence that is equivalent to Line (19)'s statement. (We do not discuss this topic here because it was discussed in adequate detail in [55] . ) b. Although the IS D (α) axiom system is well-defined entity for all inputs D and α , this fact does not also guarantee that IS D (α) is consistent. Indeed, the Second Incompleteness Theorem implies IS D (α) is inconsistent for most inputs D and α . 6 The symbol ⌈ Φ ⌉ in (18) denotes Φ 's Gödel number, and the symbol Prf β ( ⌈ Φ ⌉ , p ) will designate a ∆ * 0 stating that p is a proof of Φ. 7 In particular, if x is the Gödel number of a Π 1 sentence Φ then its "mechanically formalized negation" y is the Gödel number for " ¬ Φ ".
This issue was previously visited by us in Example 2.3. It had emphasized that "I am consistent" axioms, similar to Line (19) , can be easily encoded (via the Fixed Point theorem). However, these axiom sentences are typically useless, on account of the inconsistencies that they usually produce.
Our main result in [55] is related to Item (b)'s ironical paradigm. In particular, [55] established that Remark A.1.b's paradigm can be evaded when D corresponds to semantic tableaux deduction. Thus, [53, 55] established that the following partial boundary case exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem does arise:
Theorem A.2. [53, 55] Let D S denote the semantic tableaux deductive apparatus, and α denote any axiom system all of whose Π * 1 theorems are true sentences under the standard model using the language L * . Then IS D S (α) will prove all α's Π * 1 theorems, and it will also be consistent.
We remind the reader that Theorem A.2 is significant because the Second Incompleteness Theorems implies that most systems, formally verifying their own consistency, actually fail to be consistent. Theorem A.2 is germane to the current article because it implies the following corollary: Corollary A.3 Let D E denote the Rank-Zero-Plus enrichment of the semantic tableaux apparatus. Also, let α again denote an axiom system all of whose Π * 1 theorems are true sentences under the standard model. Then IS D E (α) will also be consistent. Corollary A.3 is an easy consequence of Theorem A.2. We will now present a brief sketch of its proof.
Proof Outline: Let α * denote the extension of the basis system α that includes one instance of axiom (20) for every ∆ * 0 formula Ψ(x) .
It is apparent that all the theorems of α * hold true under the standard model because 
